Chap.2 SMSM: Regulation

   1. Objective of SMSM Chap.2 is to address current SMS regulations and guidance material for necessary reference and awareness.
 2. It is required to spell out the current SMS regulations/standards into Chap.2 of SMSM including the compliance time frame and advisory material references as applicable.It is also required to elaborate on or explain the significance and implications of the regulations to the organization.
3. Establish a correlation with other safety-related requirements or standards.
4. Purpose of identifying and maintaining applicable regulations is to ensure that we understand our legal responsibilities
1.  5. In compliance with the standards of ICAO Annexes, various CARs specify the requirements for the establishment of SMS by an organisation. 
 
CAR Sec 1 Series C Part 1 specifies the minimum acceptable requirements for the establishment of SMS.
2.   6.  CARSec 1 Series C Part 1 lays down the aviation safety-related processes, procedures and activities for the establishment of Safety Management System (SMS) by an organization and is issued in accordance with rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937.
3.  7. CAR 145.A.65(d) The organization shall establish a Safety Management System (SMS) that: 1. Shall achieve the following objectives as a minimum:
             (i) Identifies safety hazards;
             (ii) Assesses the impact of these safety hazards and mitigates risks;
            (iii) Ensures that remedial action necessary to maintain an acceptable level of safety is implemented;
       (iv) Provides for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the safety level achieved; 
            (v) Aims to make continuous improvement to the overall level of safety.
     2. Shall meet the requirements contained in CAR Section 1 Series C part; and
     3. Shall be approved by the DGCA.
AMC 145.A.70 (d) Maintenance Organisation Exposition
         The Maintenance organization exposition should include a reference to the Safety Management Manual. As DGCA issue specific approvals for each Safety Management System, the Safety Management Manual should be issued as a specific manual and not be integrated within the Maintenance organization exposition
A company should establish a "safety and quality policy" (145.A.65(a)). This should be part of the MOE. The safety policy should define the senior management’s intentions in terms of commitment to ensuring that aircraft are returned to service after maintenance in a safe condition.
An organisation should list the processes which contribute towards safety, including 
             (i) quality processes, 
             (ii) reporting scheme(s) for defects,hazards, safety concerns, occurrences, quality discrepancies, quality feedback,maintenance errors, poor maintenance data, poor procedures, poor work instructions,
             (iii) appropriate training (including human factors training),
             (iv) shift/task handover procedures. 
The organisation should state how it addresses, or plans to address,   these issues.The accountable manager should be responsible for establishing and promoting the company safety policy. This safety policy should include a commitment to addressing the human factors elements within the organisation. In addition to defining top level responsibility, specific roles and responsibilities at other senior and middle management levels within the company should be clearly defined, with individuals being clear as to their roles in implementing the company safety policy. 

                      It is not realistic to place sole responsibility for safety on one individual, since safety is affected by many factors, some of which may be outside their control. However, it is realistic to place responsibility upon the AM to ensure that the organisation has in place the training, processes, tools, etc. which will promote safety. If the accountable manager, and other staff to whom he has devolved responsibility for action, find themselves in a situation where commercial and safety priorities potentially conflict, they should remind themselves of the content of the organisation’s safety policy which they have committed to support.

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